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Abstract
Happiness research is on the rise, but is confounded by competing definitions of subjective well-
being based on co-existing concepts, resulting in differing measures and giving rise to different 
potential policy applications.
This  paper  motivates  the  societal  necessity  for  using  well-being  indicators  and  gives  a  short 
overview of the relation between the concepts ‘subjective well-being’, ‘affect’, ‘life satisfaction’, 
and ‘happiness’. It describes their measurements and operationalizations in surveys, illustrates their 
philosophical roots, discusses their validity and reliability, and attempts to shed light on the scope 
of their policy applicability. Focus of this paper is on practical issues when applying measures of 
subjective well-being for policy evaluations. Target audiences of this paper are the interested public 
and laypersons, non-expert economists, and statisticians.  
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1. Background: Why do we need a subjective well-being measure ?
1.1. Why income is so important to economists
Traditional economic theory equates utility with the satisfaction achieved through consumption of 
material goods, services, and leisure. In a life-time utility model, current income is split between 
current  consumption and savings.  Savings,  however,  constitute  post-poned consumption,  which 
will take place later in time.2  Through mathematical transformation, utility can be thought of as 
being directly determined by income and the price level (‘indirect utility’). As income increases, so 
does utility,  so economic theory says.  This view explains  well  the dominating role  of national 
income and economic growth in public discussions and political decision-making processes. 
The strong focus on consumption as sole determinant of satisfaction is much owed to the historical 
societal  circumstances  at  the  time  when  the  foundations  of  economic  theory  were  laid.  In  a 
Malthusian  world  which  was  characterized  by  low  life  expectancy,  no  education,  high  infant 
mortality, bad working conditions, but even higher fertility, most of the population was living at or 
below  subsistence  level  (e.g.  Courard-Hauri,  2007).  In  such  world,  there  was  an  apparent 
connection  between  more  income and  higher  well-being,  easily  measurable  by the  number  of 
commodities and services one was able to consume (food, shelter, clothing, health care). Expressed 
in modern terms, the majority of the population lacked the ‘basic needs’ and the overall situation 
was not much different from what we observe today in developing countries. Assuming that utility 
could be directly observed and measured using survey questions on  subjective well-being (SWB) 
(we return later  to  this  point),  and  further  assuming that  GDP was an appropriate  measure  of 
population  consumption,  Easterlin  (1974)  has  shown for  the  USA that  there  is  no  connection 
between the  evolution  of  GDP and the  development  in  average  happiness.3 (See  also  Fischer, 
2009b, which presents a graphical presentation for a later and longer time horizon).
2 Allowing  for  bequest,  parents’ savings  may  increase  their  children’s’ consumption  and,  thus,  their  children’s 
satisfaction. Assuming interpersonal utility dependence (e.g. a dynastic utility) and perfect foresight, bequeathing their 
children will raise parental satisfaction.  
3 In the original article of 1974, Easterlin reports a decline in the share of happiest from 1963 to 1969, a time of  
unambiguously rising GDP per capita (15000 US$ - 18000US$), paralelled by an increase in the share of unhappiest, 
with a stable mean. 
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1.2. Social indicators needed to complement GDP
Seemingly,  development  of  population  well-being  and  evolution  of  wealth  appear  to  be 
disconnected in developed countries (for a thorough discussion, see Fischer 2009b).4 The level of 
national  income  from  which  on  GDP and  happiness  are  disentangled  appears  to  lie  between 
10’000$ and 15’000$ per capita (e.g. Frey and Stutzer, 2000). In developed countries, GDP appears 
to lose its importance as single measure of societal progress because it neglects aspects of e.g. 
• income inequality (social comparisons) 
• social cohesion (commuting, mobility, migration), 
• leisure time and other non-market activities (work-life balance)  
• combating physical and social destruction, which enter positively (crime, terror)
• reduction of social capital, which enters positively (private market-priced services substitute 
voluntary engagement)
• deterioration of population health, which enters positively (health care costs)
In the so-called Istanbul declaration (2007)5 various international and supranational organizations 
have  acknowledged  the  need  to  complement  purely  consumption-based  GDP with  alternative 
measures  of  societal  progress.  Various  indicators  have  been  developed.  The  most  prominent 
example  is  probably the  Human Development  Index,  which  is  often  applied  for  assessing  the 
progress of societies in developing countries.6 Other examples include, e.g. health indicators, equity 
indicators,  prevalence  of  crime  measures,  etc.  These  indicators  aim  at  reflecting  the  quality 
dimension of societal progress and are based on objectively measurable data. Notably, each of these 
social indicators relates to a specific dimension of human well-being. For example, of the social 
indicators presented e.g. in the OECD publication “Society at a Glance 2006” (OECD, 2007), the 
self-sufficiency and equity indicators relate to financial well-being, equity, the health indicators to 
mental  and  physical  well-being,  the  social  cohesion  indicators  to  societal  well-being,  the 
sustainability indicators to environmental well-being, some social indicators to well-being in the 
family or work realm. 
4 One explanation is that with growing (national) income, through adaption processes, the consumption component  of 
utility becomes less important, while social comparisons, which cancel each other out at the country level, gain in 
importance (Clark, Frijters, Shields, 2008; see also the overview in Fischer, 2009a).  
5 See http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/14/46/38883774.pdf  (9 Jan 2009)
6 This index is a normalized indicator which is based on measures of life expectancy, literacy, educational attainment, 
and GDP per capita as its components. 
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1.3. A new social indicator: subjective well-being (SWB) 
This report suggests and introduces a new social indicator, called ‘subjective well-being’ (SWB). 
‘Subjective well-being’ is another expression for the perceived quality of the life one leads and the 
positive emotions one experiences;  thus, in contrast  to the previously discussed measures,  it  is 
based on purely subjective evaluations.7 
The aim of such social indicators is to serve as benchmarks for policy evaluations, similarly to how 
GDP was (ab)used in the past.8 In place of pondering whether policy A or policy B boosts economic 
growth or not, one may equally ask whether such a policy is conducive to people’s health, reduces 
crime,  raises  social  cohesion  and  increases  networks,  or,  put  simply,  contributes  positively  to 
people’s well-being. 
The next section introduces the concept ‘subjective well-being’ in detail. 
2. The concept of ‘subjective well-being’
In general, definitions of subjective well-being are still in flux. They vary by researcher and by 
academic field. They equally vary by language in which scientific contributions are written. The 
following  section  makes  an  attempt  to  combine  the  differing,  but  overlapping  concepts  and 
definitions in a unified model, as it underlies most recent empirical happiness research. In general, 
the  definitions  developed  by psychologists  appear  broader  in  scope  compared  to  the  concepts 
applied by sociologists and economists. 
2.1. Psychological well-being
Psychologists  term  subjective  well-being  often  ‘psychological  well-being’ or  ‘positive  mental 
health’. A typical definition of subjective well-being states that it is “about lives going well” which 
comprises a “combination of feeling good and functioning effectively” (Huppert,  2008).  In the 
psychologists’ view,  the  components  of  psychological  well-being  that  relate  to  ‘feeling  good’ 
include positive emotions (contentment, happiness), but also interest and engagement, confidence, 
7 As discussed later, the term ‘subjective’ is not derived from the fact that SWB is measured through self-report survey 
questions, but rather that its point of reference is internal (i.e. the definition of a ‘good life’ is up to the surveyed 
individual). In contrast, e.g. poverty is defined by an external reference point, such as a certain income level.
8 Notably, statisticians always emphasize that the concept GDP started as a national account project and was never 
meant to assess societal progress.
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and social relations. Those related to ‘functioning’  include having a goal in life, having control, 
developing  one’s  potentials,  and  satisfying  social  relations.  Similarly,  the  World  Health 
Organization  describes  mental  health/mental  functioning  as  a  concept  which  encompasses 
“subjective  well-being,  perceived  self-efficacy,  autonomy,  competence,  intergenerational 
dependence,  and self-actualization  of  one’s  intellectual  and  emotional  potential,  among others” 
(WHO, 2001, page 5). This definition almost equals the quality-of-life definition (QoL), which 
recently appears to converge with concepts of psychological and subjective well-being (Camfield 
and Skevington, 2008).  
  
2.2. Subjective well-being
Sociologists and economists define subjective well-being more narrowly,  excluding some facets 
that  are  included  by  psychologists  or  the  QoL approach.  For  example,  physical  and  mental 
functioning would not be considered components of subjective well-being, but rather be viewed as 
their conditions. However, functioning (life-ability) would still be part of a broader concept of QoL. 
Excluded from the sociological and economic definition of subjective well-being are also aspects of 
meanings  of  life.  The  latter  comprises  both  objective  (outer  qualities)  and  subjective  (inner 
qualities) dimensions of ‘life chances’ and ‘life results’. Within this concept, subjective well-being 
constitutes the subjective dimension of life results. The sociologist Veenhoven (2000)  provides a 
detailed classification which is compared to competing popular concepts (and related measures) 
developed by various philosophers and social scientists (e.g. Brock, 1993; Sandoe, 1999; McCall, 
1975; Ware, 1996; Ouelette-Kuntz, 1990; Cummins, 1993; Allardt, 1976), at the time of his writing. 
The following Table 1 illustrates these relations:
Table 1: Definition of subjective well-being (SWB)
Outer Qualities Inner qualities
Life chances Liveability of environment
(nature, society)
Life-ability of person
(functioning, autonomy, control)
Life results Utility of life
(goal of life, moral perfection)
Appreciation of life
(overall appraisals: subjective well-
being, happiness, life satisfaction;
domain satisfaction)
* affective    * cognitive
  Source: Extracted from Veenhoven (2000), p.4 and p.11.
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2.3 The affective and cognitive components of subjective well-being
‘Subjective well-being’ (Diener, 1984), the subjectively assessed quality of life from the beholder’s 
viewpoint, is composed of two components: the affective and the cognitive component. The two 
components are considerably distinct: While the affective component constitutes momentaneous 
emotional  states  and instantaneous feelings,  the  cognitive  component  is  defined as  an  ex-post, 
retrospective assessment of the quality of the life as a whole (Sumner, 1996). Thus, while the first 
component is related to experiencing the ‘now and here’, the second is ‘remembered’ and relates to 
the whole time horizon spanned by a human life up to the time point of evaluation. While the first 
constitutes an unfiltered physical reaction, the second requires the interviewee to step back and 
reflect, and, thus, is the outcome of a cognitive process. In general, the first component is often 
referred to as ‘emotional well-being’, ’affect’ or ‘hedonic flow of pleasures and pains’, while the 
second is called ‘life satisfaction’ or ‘happiness’ (Andrews and Whitey, 1976). Confusion is often 
created by the fact that some researchers still use the term ‘happiness’ to refer to affective states 
(e.g. Diener et al., 2008). In the tradition of Kahneman (e.g. Kahneman and Krueger, 2006), the 
one, affective component would be termed ‘experienced utility’, and the other ‘decision utility’ or 
‘remembered utility’.9 Table 2 summarizes these differences: 
 Despite their conceptual differences, both components of subjective well-being have in common 
not  only that  their  points  of  reference  are  internal,  which  makes  them subjective  (in  terms  of 
comparison used), but also that they cannot be directly and objectively observed by an outsider. 
Most measures trying to grasp ‘affect’ or ‘life satisfaction’ are necessarily self-reported and self-
evaluative, and, thus, subjective (in the sense of subjectively measured). In contrast, a health state 
or a personal financial situation can be objectively assessed, and an objective, external threshold 
(e.g. a poverty line) can be set. These two facets of subjective well-being are also reflected in the 
various  variants  SWB questions  posed  in  surveys  and utilized  in  empirical  studies,  as  well  as 
reflected  in  discussions  on measurement  and data  collection issues.  We return  to  this  point  of 
measurement in sections 6 and 7 on ‘operationalization in surveys’ and ‘validity and reliability of 
SWB measures’. 
9 A similar concept to that of experienced utility is the notion ‘process benefit’ that derives from “direct subjective 
consequences from engaging in come activities” independent  from the feelings  about the outcome of  this activity 
(Juster, Courant and Dow, 1985). Economists term these benefits ‘procedural utility’ as opposed to ‘outcome utility’.   
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Table 2: Components of SWB: definitions, alternative terms, data collection
Affective component of SWB Cognitive component of SWB
Definition and characteristics
feelings and emotions
pleasures and pains
the quality of life as a whole
instantaneous ex-post, retrospective
hedonic eudaimonic
event-specific global
J. Bentham (Utilitarianism) Aristoteles (eudaimonia <= eu + daimon)
Alternative labels
Moment utility
Hedonic utility
Util
Affect
Affective Well-Being
Experienced utility
Procedural utility/ process benefits
Contentment
Life satisfaction
Happiness
Cognitive Well-Being
Remembered utility
Decision utility/ outcome utility
Data collection
Laboratory experiments, 
Day Reconstruction Method (DRM),
Experience Sampling Method (ESM) 
Opinion surveys (e.g. household panels)
Economic modelling of SWB
This distinction between affective and cognitive components of SWB is also reflected in some 
economic models. For example, Deaton (2007) assumes that (current) life-time utility is composed 
of an intertemporal integral of experienced utilities (utils) in the past. (“utility is intertemporally 
additive, which allows us to talk about instantaneous and lifetime utility in a simple way”, p.7). 
Relating his model to the definition of subjective well-being, Deaton proposes that the cognitive 
component life satisfaction has the affective component as constituent. This view is in the tradition 
of J. Bentham (1789) who equally assumed subjective well-being to be the sum of pleasures and 
the absence of pain (hedonic experiences). However, Deaton (2007) is rather an exception, as the 
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focus of most economists lies on modelling life-time utility viewed as decision utility (as utility 
derived directly from consumption and saving over the life-time).  
The  next  section  discusses  the  relevance  of  the  two  components  of  SWB  for  policy-decision 
making from a SWB-conceptional viewpoint.  
3. Relevance of affective or cognitive components for policy evaluations:  
adaptation and bounded rationality
There is an ongoing debate among happiness researchers whether empirical research should use, 
and policy recommendations should rely on, measures of the affective or the cognitive component 
of subjective well-being. In general, each component is useful in its own right, and appropriateness 
may depend on the policy question raised.
3.1. Affective well-being
Advantages
Laboratory  experiments  inflicting  pain  on  test  subjects  have  revealed  the  difference  between 
experienced and remembered utility – the latter appears to be a weighted average of experienced 
utils. However,  peak experiences and those at the end of the experiments appeared to be given 
larger weights compared to medium-impact or more distanced pains (so-called ‘peak-end-rule’), 
while  the  duration  of  these  experiences  did  not  play  a  role  for  remembered  utility  (so-called 
‘duration neglect’) (Kahneman et al., 1993). In other words, remembered utility is shaped by strong 
adaptation effects which occur almost instantly after a certain event has occurred. The longer the 
distance in time between event and assessment of personal SWB, the greater the difference between 
changes  in  affective  and  cognitive  component  of  SWB  will  be.  Fischer  (2009a)  discusses 
adaptation effects more in detail and provides examples for certain life events. 
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Policy applications
Thus, using measures of the cognitive component to assess the impact of e.g. pain and illness may 
actually  understate  their  true  effects  on  subjective  well-being.  However,  the  line  of  happiness 
research that  assesses psychic  costs  of experiencing a certain  event  (such as physical  damage, 
disability,  unemployment)  and  attempts  to  calculate  monetary  (income)  equivalents  for  their 
compensation may complement their life satisfaction studies with measures of experienced utility 
(affect)  (e.g.  Oswald and  Powdthavee,  2006, for income equivalents  for disabilities).  However, 
assuming that subjective well-being is the intertemporal integral over utils, such approach requires 
the collection of affect  measures on a more frequent basis and over a longer time span than most 
data bases provide (for a discussion of data collection, see below).
Applications of affect measures may also include an assessment of the impact of macro-shocks and 
their path of adaptation, particularly in case habituation occurs so fast that it may disguise (or have 
no) effects on remembered utility. For examples, the psychic costs of negative news such as the 
financial market crisis or terrorist attacks could be evaluated, and their adaptation paths could be 
observed. Is such news worse in their emotional response when they come as ‘big bang’, or when 
they are  released  step-by-step  in  homeopathic  doses?   The  same question  may be  raised  with 
respect to the optimal sequence of political and social policy reforms. 
3.2. Cognitive well-being
The cognitive component determines choices
However,  there  is  also  a  strong  argument  for  focusing  on  remembered  utility  rather  than 
experienced utility. Scientific evidence suggests that actual individual decisions and choices are 
determined by the cognitive component of SWB rather than its affective component, because of the 
above-described adaptation effects that take place (Kahneman and Krueger, 2006).  To illustrate, 
our choice of future vacation is determined by how we remember the last vacation was, not what 
we experienced and felt at the time when we were in vacation the last time.
 
Basing choices on hedonism leads to sub-optimal behavior
Moreover,  the  overview  article  by  Kahneman  and  Thaler  (2006)  presents  arguments  of  why 
decision-making based on present-time hedonic experiences in place of remembered utility may 
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lead to choices at time point t = 0 which are not utility-maximizing in a long-term perspective, at 
time point t = 1. Assuming that consistency of preferences is a necessary prerequisite for utility 
maximization, any violation thereof (inter-temporal inconsistency, e.g. regret in t = 1 of choices 
made in t = 0) will prevent achieving maximal SWB in t = 1. 
Prominent  examples  include  the  hungry  shopper  who  shops  excessively  large  quantities  or 
unhealthy sweets, or the health club membership which is never utilized (so-called ‘projection bias 
through anchoring in the current affective state’).10 Decision-making at time t = 0 for consumption 
in t = 1 may also be biased if the context of choice at t = 0 involves the comparison of two goods 
(joint evaluation), while later consuming only the chosen good. A typical example is the choice of 
an object in a store among a variety of similar, but not identical objects (e.g. television sets). The 
joint evaluation at t = 0 but separate consumption in t = 1 leads to a shift in weights attached to the 
good’s characteristics for utility in t = 1. Similarly, simultaneous choice of several goods leads to a 
diversification bias, an over-evaluation of the importance of diversification (increased dissimilarity) 
for experienced and decision utility.  Finally,  hedonic adaptation in time t  = 1 and thereafter  is 
equally mispredicted, which plays an important role when deciding on major life events in time t = 
0 (e.g. marriage, divorce, getting tenure, moving). In the long-run, only a few life events exert a 
lasting or permanent effect on utility as defined by the cognitive component of subjective well-
being. However, mispredictions are less likely if t = 1 is close to t = 0, and if the individual can 
base her judgment on similar experiences made in the past.
Taken altogether, because the focus on experienced utility in t = 0 may bias predictions of future 
utility in t = 1, higher levels of actual utility in t = 1 could be achieved if choices were based on 
remembered utility instead. Possibly, in case personal remembered utility was not available to the 
individual  for  unbiased  decision-making,  an  average  person’s  utility  changes  may  serve  as 
benchmark. Hence, if policy-makers are interested in understanding people’s actual choices and 
possibly, intend to influence their real-life behaviours to maximize their utilities, it is the cognitive 
component of subjective well-being that should be focused on for policy evaluations. 11 
10 Even though Kahneman and Thaler (2006) claim that these biases relate to experienced utility only, they may 
actually affect remembered utility /life satisfaction. For example, the consumption of sweets in t = 1 may still create a 
positive affect, but a negative impact on remembered utility. So what is mispredicted in t = 0  (when sweets are bought) 
is not the affect in t = 1 (immanent utility experienced from consumption) but decision utility (remembered utility), e.g. 
when the gain in body weight becomes evident.
11 Using  the term ‘decision utility’ implies both analyzing the determinants of current subjective well-being as well as 
the impact of subjective well-being on future choices. 
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3.3.  Affective versus cognitive well-being  
However,  depending  on  the  type  of  well-being  indicator  employed,  the  effects  for  policy 
implications are unclear. The cognitive and the affective component may also relate to the short-
term and long-term effects of circumstantial changes on SWB, which possibly can be influenced by 
policy-makers. In general, the variation in SWB across persons is said to be 30% determined by 
genes, thus not being subject to external interventions (Lykken and Tellegen, 1996). 30% of the 
variation  is  long-term,  influenced  by  factors  that  can  be  changed  only  in  the  long-run  (e.g. 
education, major life events), while 30% of the variation is short-run and momentaneous, caused by 
changes in mood and affect (Diener et al., 2008).  Thus, policy makers may be able to influence up 
to 60% of the variance, but most likely deliberately only 30%. For example, long-term projects 
such as the improvements in institutional quality may be conducive to individuals’ life satisfaction 
in the long run, but it may not affect the number of positive experiences or moods made on a daily 
basis.  In  the  extreme case,  better  quality government  institutions  may even lead to  less  social 
interactions  (due  to  less  need  to  intervene  from the  citizenry’s  viewpoint)  and  thus  to  lesser 
occasions of experiencing positive feelings.
The following sections discuss the concept ‘domain satisfaction’ in relation with ‘life satisfaction’, 
before we turn to questions of operationalization of the two components of SWB using survey 
designs. 
4. Life satisfaction and domain satisfaction
4.1.  Definition and domains
Life satisfaction as a general  assessment  of the quality of one’s  life  as a  whole constitutes  an 
overarching,  multi-facetted,  and multi-domain-encompassing concept.  However,  satisfaction can 
also  be  assessed  with  respect  to  certain  aspects  of  one’s  life,  or  certain  ‘domains’.  Prominent 
examples include financial satisfaction (= satisfaction with one’s wealth and income situation), job 
satisfaction,  satisfaction  with  one’s  health,  or  satisfaction  with  one’s  marriage  and  family life. 
Definitions  of  domain  satisfaction  vary  by  study  and  author.  Cummins  (1996)  proposes  the 
following seven domains of life as main contributors to quality of life: material well-being, health, 
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productivity,  intimacy,  safety,  community,  and  emotional  well-being.12 However,  besides  these 
more traditional domains exist also governance structure and organisation (government, democracy, 
police), government services (welfare and community services), or life maintenance (housework, 
house maintenance). 
4.2. Methodology and determinants of domain satisfaction
In principle, most of the methodological issues relating to life satisfaction, discussed below and 
above, are equally applicable to domain satisfaction measures. While life satisfaction is utilized and 
assumed  to  measure  the  latent  concept  ‘utility’,  satisfaction  with  a  specific  domain  of  life  is 
supposed to measure utility experienced in that domain only. In other words, while life satisfaction 
encompasses  all  market  and  non-market  activities  in  the  present  and  past  without  exception, 
domain satisfaction is derived from one outcome that relates to or occurs in that specific domain. 
Its determinants are, however, both domain-specific but also more generic. E.g. job satisfaction is 
determined by labor–related characteristics pay, work hours, work place characteristics, relations 
with colleagues, but equally by general socio-demographic factors that  simultaneously relate to 
other domains of life such as gender, household type, education, and more. 
Domain satisfaction and objective measures of domain-specific well-being 
Subjective  satisfaction  with  a  certain  domain  is  (potentially)  mirrored  by objective  well-being 
measures  relating  to  that  domain;  e.g.  self-reported  satisfaction  with  health  may  have  its 
counterpart in indicators of objectively observable health status. Thus, various (but not all) domain 
satisfactions  can  also  be  related  to  objective  social  indicators  that  reflect  the  sufficiency  of 
economic or financial resources, social well-positioning and integration in society, or a pleasant and 
good-health-supporting  environment.  In  contrast,  for  the  subjective  measure  of  global  life 
satisfaction,  up-to-now, no objectively observable counterpart is available on a large scale.  The 
section on the validity of subjective well-being measures (section 7) discusses in depth attempts to 
objectively measure people’s utility.   
12 The same study uses information on more than 350 different domains.  
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Current research on/using domain satisfaction
The  relation  between  domain  satisfaction  and  life  satisfaction  appears  to  belong  to  the  rather 
neglected aspects of happiness research. Indeed, most research either focuses on socio-economic 
determinants  of  satisfaction  (with  life  or  with  a  certain  domain),  or  analyzes  the  impact  of 
domain/life  satisfaction  on  other  economic  outcomes  (e.g.  human  behaviour  such  as  early 
retirement decisions). 
An example for the first type of study is Nielsen and Smyth (2008) which identifies determinants of 
job satisfaction of Chinese urban workers, such as gender, age, income, education, type of job, and 
migrant status. In a similar fashion, Ateca-Amestoy et al. (2008) explore the socio-demographic 
factors that contribute to satisfaction with leisure, among them also health and disability status, 
expenditures on leisure activities, social capital,  and environmental factors. An example for the 
second type of analysis is the study by Rode et al. (2007), which predicts the intention to quit the 
job and finds that both job and life satisfaction independently serve as mediating factors of work-
family-conflict. 
4.3. Relation life satisfaction – domain satisfaction
Life  satisfaction  reflects  an  overall  assessment  of  life  in  general,  while  domain  satisfaction 
constitutes,  analogously,  an  assessment  of  a  certain  life  domain.  Some  happiness  researchers 
believe that overall life satisfaction can be constructed using information on the various domain 
satisfactions.  For  example,  using  an  objective  measure  of  quality  of  life  (the  Comprehensive 
Quality of Life Scale, which the author also terms ‘life satisfaction’), the meta-study by Cummins 
(1996)  attempts  to  identify  and  quantify  the  contributions  of  seven  domains  of  life  to  ‘life 
satisfaction’.  In  contrast,  other  researchers  believe  that  life  satisfaction  as  a  global  evaluation 
cannot be broken into constituent parts. 
That 68% of the variance in life satisfaction could be explained by eight domain satisfactions is 
reported by Fugl-Meyer, Branholm, and Fugl-Meyer (1991) for 200 inhabitants in Umea, a city in 
Northern  Sweden.  Factor  analysis  shows that  emotion-related domain  satisfactions  (partnership 
relations, family life, sexual life, and absence of disability) account for about half of the variance, 
while satisfactions with contacts with friends (informal networks) and leisure activities account for 
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about  9%. The same contribution to  life  satisfaction  is  observed for  the third factor,  which  is 
composed  of  vocational  and  financial  satisfaction.  The  most  well-researched  correlation  of  a 
domain satisfaction with life satisfaction is the satisfaction with one’s job, ranging between 0.3 and 
0.4, depending on the study (see Rode et al., 2007, for an overview).    
Table 3: Correlations of life satisfaction with domain satisfactions in the World Values Survey
Categories wave 5 waves 3-4 waves 1-4
Financial satisfaction 10 0.5379 0.6133 0.5800
Expected life satisfaction in 5 years 10 0.5744
Satisfaction with home life 10 0.5377
Feelings of happiness 4 0.4945 0.4795 0.4879
Job satisfaction 10 0.4278
Satisfaction with job security 10 0.3968
Do you ever feel very lonely 4 -0.3274
Ever felt depressed or unhappy 2 -0.2906
Self-reported health state 5 0.3196 0.2595 0.2955
Satisfaction with how democracy develops 4 0.2201
Satisfaction with people in national office 4 0.1020 0.1438
 Notes: Correlation with life satisfaction which is measured on a 10-point scale. All correlation 
coefficients are significant at the 1 percent level. 
4.4. Correlation of domain with life satisfactions for cross-country micro-data
The current 5th wave of the World Values Survey (2005), which contains data on 76’000 persons in 
52  countries,  allows  to  calculate  the  correlations  between  life  satisfaction  and  several  domain 
satisfactions,  such  as  emotional  well-being,  satisfaction  with  the  financial  situation  of  the 
household, and subjective state of health. Also employed are the combined 3rd and 4th waves (1997-
2001), comprising 120’0000 persons in more than 80 countries, and the combined 1st to 4th waves of 
the World Values Survey (1980-2001; 270’000 persons in more than 80 countries). These yield 
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additional insights into the unconditional correlations between various domain satisfactions and life 
satisfaction, reported in Table 3. 
The general impression is that satisfaction with personal circumstances (job, family life, finances, 
positive affect and aspirations,  ρ = 0.4 - 0.5) is stronger correlated with global life satisfaction 
compared  to  those  domain  satisfactions  which  relate  to  the  politico-institutional  environment 
(democracy, national office, ρ < 0.2). Inbetween are domains that relate to negative affective states 
and health (feelings of loneliness, depression, health state, ρ = -0.3/ρ = 0.3). 
5. Excursus: philosophical roots of the notion ‘happiness’ 
The present discussions on how subjective well-being is defined, how it can possibly be measured 
and, ultimately, what its determinants are, use arguments and concepts that have their roots in the 
Utilitarian philosophical tradition, which, in turn, is partly directly influenced by, and related to, the 
Classical Greek tradition. Utilitarian thought assumes that the ultimate goal of any human activity 
is to reach a state of individual happiness. Therefore, as J.S. Mill states, the rightness or wrongness 
of human actions can be judged by the proportion as they promote happiness – both with respect to 
individual happiness as well as with respect to general, societal happiness. 
From Greek roots to Amartya Sen 
That human beings strive for individual happiness has already been recognized by Plato and, more 
pronounced, Aristoteles. Plato viewed a happy life as one in which the three forces inherent in one’s 
psyche  were  held  in  harmonic  equilibrium.  This  equilibrium  is  maintained  and  supported  by 
intellectual  and  practical  activities  in  an  ideal  state,  an  equally  in  ‘equilibrated’ and  ‘psyche-
equilibrating’ governance structure (Plato,  Politeia, second book), Aristoteles’ concept was more 
real-world oriented. The latter defined a happy man as a man with ‘eu-daimonia’ (good daimon). 
This eudaimonic state could be achieved through fulfilment of human potentialities, by living out 
human reason through activities of human intellect and social-societal participation in a virtuous 
way.  While  Aristoteles’ focus  on the outliving of  human capabilities  constitutes  a  precursor  to 
Amartya Sen's capabilities’ approach of full human functioning (Sen, 1985; Nussbaum, 2000),  his 
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focus on the quality of life as a whole as objective goal of one’s life developed into one of the 
major strands of 18th century Utilitarism.    
Utilitarism
In  Utilitarism two  concepts  of  ‘happiness’ co-exist:  the  hedonic  one  and  the  eudaimonic  one. 
Rooting  in  Epicure’s  philosophy but  re-introduced as  concept  by Jeremy Bentham (1789)  into 
classical moral philosophy, the hedonic approach defines happiness as absence of pain and presence 
of pleasure (εδονη  (gr.)  = pleasure, joy). Any human action is deemed as good if,  in a purely 
quantitative addition, the induced amount of pleasure is greater than the amount of pain. While the 
quantitative dimension takes account of both intensity and duration of pain, the quality dimension 
is  neglected.  J.S.  Mill  (1863),  still  in the Bentham tradition,  makes a distinction between ‘low 
pleasures’ and ‘high pleasures’. However, going beyond the hedonic conception, he assumes that 
happiness is more than a mere accumulation of positive emotional states and feelings, namely an 
ordered whole. Now in the eudaimonic tradition, he asserts that, ultimately, only higher pleasures 
such as pleasures of intellect, artistic activities, moral goodness, etc. can contribute to a happy life. 
Thus, Bentham is one of the few Utilitarians who tries to combine the eudaimonic with the hedonic 
tradition,  of  which  the  first  relates  happiness  to  life  as  a  whole,  while  the  latter  focuses  on 
instantaneous  experiences  of  pleasure.  This  distinction  between  the  eudaimonic  and  hedonic 
conceptions of a happy life still  dominates the present-day discussions on subjective well-being 
(see Table 1), having an impact on, ultimately, policy conclusions.  
We now turn to the question of measurement of SWB in surveys and appropriate data collection.  
6. Operationalization of measuring subjective well-being in surveys
6.1. Measuring SWB components and data collection
Both cognitive and affective components of subjective well-being are measured through surveys in 
their various forms, including modern technologies of physical surveillance (e.g. measurement of 
electric resistance of skin to  assess emotional  states).  The latter  are  rather  cost-intensive when 
applied to a larger number of subjects or for a longer time span - therefore these are rather seldomly 
used, or exploited, by empirical happiness researchers. However, the cost argument also applies to 
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traditional paper-and-pencil-based surveys or telephone-administered questionnaires. At least in the 
past,  this  technological  restriction  lead  to  an annual  cycle  of  repetition,  if  at  all.  Even though 
modern technologies may make surveillance of persons on a 24-hour basis affordable, this section 
will focus on what is available now for empirical analysis, which are people’s answers to questions 
in more or less traditional surveys. We start with a general discussion of the relation between the 
subjective  well-being  component  to  be  measured  and  suitable  frequency  of  data  collection, 
followed by a description of the most commonly employed survey methods and questions. Table 1 
(above) gives a brief overview. 
As described in the introduction to the concept ‘subjective well-being’, SWB encompasses two 
components:  an  affective  component  and  a  cognitive  one.  Important  to  the  question  of  data 
collection is  that  the first  relates,  in principle,  to the actual instant only (the ‘now’), while the 
second implies a retrospection, starting from the ‘now’ backwards into the very past.
6.2. Data collection: affect measures
The affect component is related to instantaneous positive and negative feelings. A simple affect 
measure would be to ask “How do you feel (now/yesterday/last week) ?”, “Do you feel lonely?” or 
“Do  you  feel  depressed  ?”.13 However,  affect  is  usually  more  indirectly  assessed  by  asking 
questions on recently experienced life events which are supposed to trigger negative or positive 
feelings, such as divorce, experiencing an accident, having been praised, or having successfully 
passed  an  exam (Bradburn,  1969).  A widely  employed  affect  measure  is  the  so-called  affect-
balance-scale. 14  
It is obvious that the characteristics of instantaneity of affects, their ‘now’-relatedness, makes any 
of their  measures  rather useless when applied too infrequently.  What can we conclude when a 
person  felt  ‘positive’ at  23.45h on  day 17  of  October  2008,  and  then  experienced  a  negative 
moment at 13.12h on day 20 in March 2009? Affects, according to their definition and very nature, 
13 According to most psychologists, asking about feelings experienced during the last week is a good proxy for the 
current affective state as past  general feelings cannot be recalled so that the respondent projects her current affective 
state  into  the  near  past;  on  the  other  hand,  asking  about  respondent’s  present general  feelings  leads  to  large 
measurement errors (personal communication, 24 July 2009).
14 Bradburn's (1969) affect-balance scale is based on a calculation of the difference between positive and negative 
emotions. It is sometimes criticized for assuming that negative and positive effects oppose each other rather than being 
orthogonal (see also Fischer and Sousa-Poza, 2008).
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change fast, possibly from one second to the next (psychologists claim that one’s affective state 
changes, on average, every 10 minutes,  personal communication, 24 July 2009). They constitute the 
most volatile and fluctuating component of subjective well-being, which are most sensitive to the 
tiniest environmental changes. They may even change due to entirely internal processes, such as 
sudden memories of past events (Schwarz and Clore, 1983).  
Thus,  longitudinal  studies  that  employ  affect  measures  should  record  them  as  frequently  as 
possible.  Traditional  household  surveys,  however,  are  carried  out  on  an  annual  basis.  More 
appropriate are data collection methods requesting respondents to report their emotions and feelings 
several times during the day. The Experience Sampling Method (ESM) uses handheld computers to 
regularly  self-assess  subjects’  affective  states  and  record  their  current  activities.  The  Day 
Reconstruction Method (DRM) allows at least for a daily recording by writing diaries. Usually, 
DRM asks participants to summarize their episodes (activities) of the preceding day (types and 
duration)  and  report  the  intensity  of  their  feelings  experienced  during  each  of  them (see  also 
Kahneman and Krueger, 2006).
The Gallup data 
It appears that the only institution that collects data on affective states on a daily basis for a large 
sample is the Gallup organization, which conducts such surveys on affective states of residents in 
the USA, with about 1000 representative individuals interviewed per telephone per day. In several 
European countries, a weekly collection will soon be realized (oral communication, 14 Nov 2008). 
Even though these data are not longitudinal but constitute repeated cross-sections, they will allow 
assessments of affective states  for an average person,  but  within the limitations  of micro-level 
cross-sectional  design,  explaining  levels  of  affect.  Alternatively,  when  aggregated  to  a  higher 
geographical level (e.g. regional level), they may also allow to assess both levels and changes in 
affective states in the population. 
6.3. Data collection: Life satisfaction measures
Life satisfaction measures constitute cognitive evaluation of the quality of one’s life as a whole. By 
definition, life satisfaction should respond only to major life events, which affect the instantaneous 
utils over a long time-span in the same direction (assuming that lifetime utility is an accumulation 
of  discounted  instantaneous  utils,  e.g.  Deaton  2007).  Such  events  may  include  divorce  and 
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separation, unemployment, becoming disabled, or losing a close person. Fischer (2009a) discusses 
the impact of such person-specific events on one’s life satisfaction. In theory, for the general case 
that no life event occurs between two points in time, t = 0 and t = 1, it should not matter whether 
life satisfaction is measured in t = 0 (now) or in t = 1 (e.g. 20 minutes later, today, or one day later). 
(Notably,  the  theoretical  concept ‘life  satisfaction’ is  distinct  from the  survey  question on  life 
satisfaction.  In  real  life,  we observe that  affective states  do influence how the life  satisfaction 
question is responded to, giving rise to measurement errors in the responses. We discuss this point 
in the section on test-retest reliability in section 7.) 
Up-to-date, most empirical studies still rely on survey questions which are posed (if carried out as 
longitudinal survey) in regular intervals, usually annually – an appropriate frequency for assessing 
(changes in) the ‘life satisfaction’ component of SWB.15 Most national household panel data are 
collected annually, as are some international surveys that constitute repeated cross-sections (e.g. 
International Social Survey Programme, the European Barometer Survey).16 (Technical note: While 
in a household panel a representative, but identical sample of the resident population is interviewed 
on a regular basis, a repeated cross-section is characterized by the fact that the composition of the 
sample changes from one wave to the next,  although each wave remains representative for the 
underlying  national  population.)  As  exception,  the  Australian  household  panel  appears  to  be 
conducted 3-monthly which allows more precise evaluation of adaptation effects on life satisfaction 
over a longer time span.
6.4. Happiness with life versus satisfaction with life 
The  cognitive  component  of  SWB,  ‘life  satisfaction’,  is  assessed  using  two  types  of  survey 
question: one which asks the respondent to rate the ‘happiness’ with her life (or some variant), 
while the alternative and recently more commonly used survey question requires an assessment of 
the respondent’s overall ‘satisfaction’ with her life as a whole (or some variant). Let us term the 
first type the ‘happiness question’ and the second the ‘life satisfaction question’. Notably, both aim 
at measuring the latent concept life satisfaction. 
15 Annual surveys of life satisfaction are contained in the British, German, and Swiss household panels. The Australian 
household panel is updated on a quarterly basis. See Fischer (2009a) for the discussion of adaptation effects. 
16 The famous World Values Survey (WVS) is collected only irregularly, on average every 5 years, with an altering 
number of participating countries.
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Examples for proto-type survey questions are “Overall, how satisfied are you with your life these 
days?”,  or  “How happy are  you  with  your  life?”.  Traditionally,  the  answers  to  the  happiness 
question express the degree of agreement, e.g. ‘strongly disagree’, ‘somewhat disagree’, ‘somewhat 
agree’,  etc.),  and is  measured on a  3- to  4-point,  or  sometimes 5-point  scale.  Instead,  the life 
satisfaction question is recorded as 10-point or 11-category variable. Possible answers are presented 
to the interviewee on a numerical scale, with the lowest number labelled ‘completely satisfied’ and 
the  highest  ‘completely  dissatisfied’  (or  some  variant  thereof)  and  no  labelling  for  values 
inbetween. (In general,  items asking the respondent to express the degree of agreement with a 
certain  statement,  as  the happiness  and some affect  measures do,  are  said to  use the so-called 
Likert-scale (Likert, 1932); psychologists claim that asking for respondent’s ‘agreement’ triggers a 
‘yes’-bias,  personal  communication  15-16  July  2009).  Please  note  that  the  life  satisfaction 
question/item is often said to be measured on the satisfaction-with-life-scale (SWLS), in terminal 
analogy to the affect-balance-scale that measures affects (Diener et al., 1985)). How the differences 
in scaling influences the choice of method of analysis and interpretation of outcome is discussed in 
the section 8 on ‘Cardinal versus ordinal interpretation of SWB measures’. 
The Cantril’s ladder scale of life satisfaction
Recently, the Cantril’s ladder version of the life satisfaction question has become more and more 
popular,  most prominently applied by the Gallup organization.  The Cantril-ladder version (first 
described  in  Kilpatrick  and  Cantril,  1960;  Cantril,  1965)  requires  respondents  to  rate  the 
satisfaction  with  their  lives  relative  to  self-defined  minima  and  maxima  of  life  satisfaction 
(concepts of “the worst/best possible life for you”, applied to the question “on which step of the 
ladder do you feel you personally stand at the present time”). This question may well abstract from 
affects through self-anchoring, on the one hand, and well solve the ‘closed-scale problem’ of the 
traditionally employed life satisfaction and happiness questions described above.17 However, the 
analysis by Bjørnskov (2008) suggests that the World Values Survey question and the Cantril’s 
ladder question measure two distinct concepts of life satisfaction.18 In particular, the concept of a 
‘best  possible life’ may be sensitive to  culture and expectations,  for example on the economic 
development. Indeed, according to his analysis, correlations of life satisfaction à la Cantril with 
economic development are quite low, and the famous positive 'Latin America' effect disappears. 
17 The ‘closed-scale problem’ refers to the fact that levels of life satisfaction beyond the maximum of the scale (e.g. 
higher than category 10) cannot be recorded.
18 Using the Cantril’s ladder in the Gallup data also implies a downsizing of country averages compared to the equally 
scaled World Values Survey life satisfaction question, in general.
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Even worse, in a multivariate analysis democratic rights, corruption, and political ideology show 
reversed signs compared to the well-known findings based on the traditional happiness and life 
satisfaction questions. However, more research is needed that clarifies the differences between the 
various variants of the SWB question. 
 Separation of measures relating to two distinct components of SWB
From a conceptual perspective, since the affective component of SWB is assumed distinct from the 
cognitive one, measures relating to the first should not overlap with measures of the second. In 
other words, one may well feel ‘unhappy’ but still overall assess the quality of one’s life as ‘good’. 
To illustrate, the fact that I am drinking a cup of coffee now with my friends (which creates a 
positive affect) should not have an influence on how satisfied I am with my life as a whole. Indeed, 
Helliwell (2008) shows that average affect is fairly identical across regions, in contrast to average 
life satisfaction which varies substantially in the same sample. Shimmack, Schupp and Wagner 
(2009)  show  that  the  correlations  of  personality  traits  or  economic  factors  with  SWB  differ 
substantially depending on which component is analyzed.19  
Similarly,  due to  the  retroperspective and evaluative nature  of  both the happiness  and the  life 
satisfaction questions, in theory, respondent’s answers should not be impacted by changes in her 
current mood. As discussed later in section 7 on reliability, this is, however, not the case: answers to 
both questions are well impacted by affective state, a typical case of measurement error. Indeed, the 
correlations between affective state measures and measures relating to the cognitive component of 
subjective well-being even serve as validity test in some studies. 
At this point of discussing advantages and disadvantages of several variants of the subjective well-
being question, attention should be drawn to the fact that the degree of contamination by affective 
state does most likely depend on differences in wording. In particular, it can be suspected that in 
some languages the word ’happy’ in the ‘happiness question’ variant of the decision utility measure 
is likely to make answers more responsive to moods than the ‘life satisfaction’-variant (e.g. Clark 
and Lelkes, 2009). However, this statement still awaits its empirical prove. 
19 Correlations  of  personality  traits  are  larger  with  affect  while  those  of  socio-demographics  are  larger  with  life 
satisfaction. Regressions for decision utility suggest that personality traits only approximate (omitted) affect.
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7. Validity and reliability: prerequisites for interpersonal and cross-country
 comparisons
Both validity and reliability determine the quality of statistical measures. Simply said, reliability 
relates to the fact that a measure yields consistent results, while validity means that the chosen 
measure  actually  assesses  what  it  is  supposed  to  assess.  Validity  is  assessed  by  conducting 
empirical tests that examine whether the measure behaves as would be expected according to the 
theories that underlie the construct (e.g. whether respondents to the life satisfaction question report 
as predicted by microeconomic utility theory). 
Reliability and validity are interlinked: the first is a component of the second. Both validity and 
reliability are necessary to establish interpersonal comparability of measures of SWB, and thus for 
exploitation of survey-based well-being questions for policy assessment in OECD countries. 
7.1. Reliability
Reliability  of  a  measure  relates  to  issues  of  consistency,  which  is  usually  hampered  by 
measurement errors. Measurement errors occur when e.g. in a questionnaire unintentionally the 
wrong box is checked, or the question is misunderstood by the respondent. Measurement errors 
may also occur when the ordering of the questions in a survey influences the answers to a certain 
question because, e.g. memories or associations have been triggered by preceding questions.20 
How to test reliability
Reliability is currently examined using three methods: first,  by posing the same question twice 
during the same interview. Second, by comparing answers to two variants of SWB measures, for 
example the life satisfaction and the happiness questions, or by comparing a single-item question 
with a multiple-item-scale question (Schwarz and Strack, 1999).21 Finally, test-retest correlations 
are  calculated  over  a  longer  time  span,  which  eliminates  memory  effects  but  makes  actual 
difference in well-being due to actual circumstantial changes more likely. 22  
20  Based on this experience, social scientists suggest that SWB should be assessed in surveys right at the beginning, 
prior  to  asking  about  respondent’s  personal  circumstances  (e.g.  income,  marital  status,  etc.),  and  the  cognitive 
component prior to the affective component (personal communication, 15-16 July 2009).
21  This test may underestimates reliability if people think they are expected to answer differently to two seemingly 
different questions. 
22  This test may overestimate reliability due to recall bias, namely that persons remember how their answers to the 
question when it was posed for the first time, and wish to be consistent.
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Results
The first and second reliability tests yield correlations between 0.6 and 0.7 (e.g. Wanous and Hudy, 
2001; Schimmack and Oishi, 2005; Lucas, Diener and Suh, 1996; Kahneman et al.,  1993).23 In 
panel studies, reliability estimates are higher (up to 0.7, Ehrhardt et al., 2000) compared to cross-
sectional studies (six-week re-test correlation of around 0.55, Schimmack et al., 2009), arguably 
due to interviewees’ increased experience with surveys (e.g. Schimmack et al., 2009).24   
Reliability  may  vary  by  a)  the  variant  of  SWB  measure  employed  (more  cognitive  or  more 
affective) and b) the scaling that is used. In general, reliability appears less sensitive to whether life 
satisfaction, happiness or affect was measured rather than to the number of categories. 10- and 11-
point scales were found to produce more reliable answers (by up to 20 %) compared to 7-, 5- or 4-
point scales (e.g. Kroh, 2009; Saris et al., 1998).25 However, compared to objective measures of 
economic outcomes, such as income (rho = 0.9), test-retest correlations are considerably lower.
7.2. Validity
Causes for loss of validity
Validity implies that the underlying construct (unobservable subjective well-being) maps well into 
the measurement  space (e.g.  the life  satisfaction question).  There are  several  causes that  could 
distort the relation between SWB and any of its survey-based measures. Notably, some of these 
concerns can be addressed through the choice of type of data and statistical methods, others can’t.  
• As Diener et al. (2008) argue, first, if answers were driven by external factors only they 
might have no relation at all with the to-be-measured internal state. For example, cultural 
norms and ‘moral visions’ may constrain the range of ‘feasible’ answers so that they would 
reflect  true  subjective  well-being  only  within  a  certain  range.  Examples  are  the 
‘modesty/self-enhancement  biases’ in  collectivist/individualist  cultures  (e.g.  Christopher, 
1999).  
23  The time gap between the test and the re-test ranges between 2 weeks and 6 weeks in these studies.
24  Based on this experience, some social scientists suggest that the first waves of a household panel should not be 
included in any empirical analysis of SWB because of the still-ongoing learning process of the interviewees.  In 
particular, interviewees are said to at first report SWB levels too high which they adjust downward in preceding 
waves (personal communication, 15-16 July 2009). 
25  Kroh (2009) also shows that reliability is not affected by whether data are collected in form of interviews or as paper-
and-pencil questionnaires.  
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• The chosen measure may reflect a subjective state but not the one it is supposed to measure. 
For example, the life satisfaction question aims at assessing one’s general evaluation of the 
quality of life as a whole. Given this, influences of emotions triggered by e.g. the weather or 
other  immediate  context  undermine  the  validity  of  the  life  satisfaction  question  in  that 
respect (Schwarz and Clore, 1983). 
• In this  context,  personality  traits  (e.g.  negative  or  positive  affectivity,  neuroticism, 
extraversion) may equally restrict the validity of this measure; the role of personality traits 
for  SWB assessment  has  been  demonstrated  in  studies  on  mono-  and diacygotic  twins 
(Stubbe et al., 2005; Lykken and Tellegen, 1996); personality traits influence the probability 
of recalling positive life events or to report signs of depression (Layard, 2005).26 
• It is often argued that words or numbers, even more on a closed scale, are inappropriate 
tools to express internal states of subjective well-being. A similar problem relates to issues 
of insufficient translation of labels from one language to another, although Ouweneel and 
Veenhoven (1991) claim that differences in language do not cause incomparability.   
• Depending on what  one aims at  measuring,  also transitory influences  on SWB through 
certain life events (see Fischer, 2009a) could be regarded as threat to the validity.  
Face and content validity
In general, so-called  face and  content validity are of no concern for commonly employed SWB 
measures: as e.g. the life satisfaction question asks for a global assessment of one’s quality of life, it 
encompasses  all  aspects  and  domains  of  the  underlying  construct  ‘subjective  well-being’.  In 
contrast,  affect  measures that  are based on several  items may not reflect  ‘happiness’ in its full 
breadth (e.g. the so-called Bradburn's (1969) affect-balance-scale had to be tested in that respect). 
In this sense, measures of e.g. self-esteem and optimism do not constitute valid measures of either 
global life satisfaction or affect because they simply reflect personality traits (‘internal dispositions’ 
as called by psychologists), but not experiences (experienced utility).27
26 According to Schimmack et al. (2008) particularly neuroticism and extraversion are main predictors of affect as these 
traits relate to how affective information is processed in the human brain. 
27 Using this related, but distinct concept of personality trait so-called discriminant validity of SWB measures can be 
assessed; discriminant validity assesses to what extent two related concepts (personality and SWB) can be measured as 
distinct concepts (e.g. Lucas et al., 1996)
.  
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Convergent validity
More important for assessing SWB measures may be the so-called convergent validity. Most of the 
published validity studies appear to relate to this facet of validity. Convergent validity assumes that 
if two measures assess the same underlying construct, they must be considerably correlated. If one 
of these measures has been proven valid, the alternative measure’s validity can be evaluated based 
on its correlation with the first. 
• Although they focus on different components of SWB, questions on affect and global life 
satisfaction  are  both  supposed  to  measure  the  latent  construct  SWB.  They  appear 
considerably correlated, not only across individuals, but even more when country means are 
calculated (Schimmack et al., 2002). 
• Convergent validity can also be tested evaluating respondent’s SWB by external informants 
who provide an independent, but subjective assessment of the interviewee’s SWB, knowing 
her personal circumstances and preferences (e.g. Wilson, 1967). Correlations are about 0.4, 
and convergent validity seems to be higher for the life satisfaction question than for affect 
measures  (Schneider  and  Schimmack,  2009).  Some  researchers  view  the  congruence 
between  observed  facial  impressions  of  ‘happy’ persons  and  their  self-report  affect/life 
satisfaction  as  form  of  such  external  validation  (for  an  overview,  see  Kahneman  and 
Krueger, 2006). 
• Validity tests which are based on objective, since physical, measures include those reporting 
large positive correlations with stress resistance, lower probability of getting a cold, and 
shorter recovery time for wound healing (Layard, 2005; Cohen et al., 1999; Kiecolt-Glaser 
et  al.,  2002).  Similarly,  assessing  psychophysiological  processes  in  the  brain  may help 
overcome the biases through labelling and translation.  Up to now, the few neurological 
studies that exist support only a weak correlation (e.g. Van Reekum et al., 2007; Urry et al., 
2004).28 
• External clinical validation studies using objective measures of health have been carried out 
by Blanchflower and Oswald (2008a) for high blood pressure (hypertension) and cardiac 
diseases.  They find a considerably high correlation of country rankings using either the 
28 Brain activity tests relate to the affective component of well-being. Emotional well-being was found to correlate with 
activity in the left prefrontal cortex, and unpleasant experiences with the prefrontal cortex on the right. Correlation of 
SWB question with the differences in both sides activities was 0.3 (Urry et al., 2004).
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objective or the subjective measure of SWB. Similar validity studies exist for heart rate 
among men and their cortisol levels and cardiovascular behavior (Steptoe et al., 2005).29 
• An alternative objective measure of life satisfaction may be the occurrence of suicide by the 
very unhappy, which we discuss in a separate section.
7.3. Happiness and suicide
According to the economic model by Hamermesh and Soss (1974) a rational life utility-maximizing 
individual  puts an end to  her life  if  the discounted (expected)  net-utility reaches zero (or falls 
below). Based on this assumption, persons who are at risk should be found at the lower tail of the 
life satisfaction distribution (current net utility > 0 but small), and an even minor negative life event 
may balance out costs and benefits of continuing life. Both Helliwell (2007) and Daly, Wilson, and 
Johnson (2007) find that socio-economic and institutional factors exert influences in suicide models 
comparable to the effects observed in happiness models. However, these studies establish validity 
only if suicide committers are assumed to be rational, and one may still argue that those persons 
behave systematically differently compared to the rest of the population (mental illness).
However, Koivumaa-Honkanen et al.  (2003) show in a study which followed 30’000 individuals 
over a time span of 20 years, that baseline happiness is a good predictor of committing suicide later 
in life, with suicide risk increasing by roughly 2 percentage points when moving down from any 
happiness category to the next lower (see also Weitoft and Rosen, 2005, for affective well-being). 
One  of  the  most  convincing  validity  studies  is  that  by  Daly  and  Wilson  (2008)  –  both 
methodologically and sample size-wise. They compare the individual risk of falling below a certain 
threshold between life satisfaction and suicide models, each based on micro-level data from the US, 
from 1970 to 2006, where drop-outs due to suicide can be identified. They find that income-related 
and  other  socio-demographic  life  events  shift  people’s  position  on  the  happiness  continuum 
identically, whether measured in terms of objectively measured suicide risk or subjective risk of ill-
being ( = being in the lowest category of the happiness scale).     
29 Validity of  country rankings based on subjective health state  measures  is  equally confirmed (Blanchflower and 
Oswald,  2008b;  Mojon-Azzi  and  Sousa-Poza,  2007).  Blanchflower  and  Oswald  (2008b)  give  references  from the 
medical literature that suggests that self-report hypertension is a valid measure of actual disease. 
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Table 4: Convergent validity tests
Source (examples)
Correlation of different SWB questions
Test-retest correlations
Schwarz and Strack (1999)
Wanous and Hudy (2001)
Schimmack et al. (2009)
External informant’s rating Wilson (1967)
Schneider and Schimmack (2009)
Kahneman  and  Krueger  (2006, 
overview)
Layard (2005, overview)
Neurological tests of brain activity Van Reekum et al. (2007)
Urry et al. (2004)
Objective measures of health 
(heart rate, blood pressure)
Blanchflower and Oswald (2008a)
Steptoe et al. (2005)
Objective measures of health improvement 
(recovery from cold, wound healing)
Cohen et al. (1999)
Kiecolt-Glaser et al. (2002)
Suicide research 
(macro-level, micro-level)
Helliwell (2007)
Daly and Wilson ( 2008)
7.4. Validity of aggregate measures of life satisfaction
Validity is also established for aggregate measures of subjective well-being, such as national means 
of happiness scores, or the shares of those reported in the highest or lowest categories. The afore-
mentioned study by Blanchflower and Oswald (2008a) compares the inverse country ranking based 
on objectively measured blood pressure with that obtained from aggregate subjective well-being 
and finds a substantial correlation. The Spearman rank correlations range between 0.5 and 0.6.30 
OECD  (2007,  p.106-107)  reports  a  negative  correlation  between  suicide  rates  and  mean  life 
satisfaction. Helliwell (2007) finds that aggregate factors, such as formal and informal institutions, 
but also macro-economic condition, influence the occurrence of suicide and population well-being 
in qualitatively identical ways.  Similarly,  Daly and Wilson (2008) report simple correlations of 
socio-economic population characteristics with suicide rates and the share of unhappiest in the US 
population that are qualitatively comparable. 
30 More specifically, country rankings are based on country dummy coefficient estimates both in a hypertension model 
and a life satisfaction model (4-point scale), using the European Barometer data of 2001 on 15’000 persons in 15 
European countries.
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Table  4  (above)  briefly  summarizes  the  methods  used  to  assess  the  convergent  validity  and 
reliability of survey-based subjective well-being measures. 
7.5. Construct validation: predictions versus empirics
Construct validation implies the assessment of the quality of a specific measure based on whether 
predictions derived from (economic) theory on the underlying construct can be verified when this 
measure  is  employed  in  empirical  analyses.  For  example,  if  the  SWB  measure  claims  to 
approximate decision utility (as underlying construct), and if economic theory predicts that utility 
rises in consumption, then any empirical study of the relation of individual consumption with this 
SWB measure should yield a positive correlation.31 A positive correlation (even with decreasing 
marginal returns) would then be interpreted as indicator that the measure was a valid representation 
of the underlying construct.  Fischer  (2009a) discusses in depth to what extent micro-economic 
predictions can be replicated in empirical happiness research. 
Empirical construct validation has been achieved for the predicted effects of individual income, but 
also health  state,  unemployment,  divorce,  disability (as proxies for income loss),  education (as 
proxy for income)32 (see Dolan et  al.,  2008, for a recent literature review from an economist’s 
perspective).
In principle, any misguided theory on what determines utility may yield wrong predictions, for 
which no corroboration with real-life data can be found. For example,  construct validation has 
failed what gave rise to the so-called Easterlin (1974) paradox. Similarly, the U-relation between 
SWB and age is considered as well-established fact, but economists have failed in modelling this 
relation  using  economic  theory  (for  discussion,  see  Fischer,  2009c).  In  fact,  many failures  to 
empirically corroborate theoretical predictions may cast doubt rather on the variant of economic 
theory used rather than on the validity of the measure.    
The role of research design
31 According to economic theory, direct utility, which depends on consumption (with income as budget constraint), can 
be re-formulated as so-called indirect utility that is a function of income (and price vector) only. Indirect utility rises in 
income.
32 Notably, these associations do not exclude other, non-economic explanations for their effects. However, in the light of 
construct validation which tests the consistence of empirical results with one specific theory, alternative explanations 
do not matter. See Fischer (2009a) for additional non-economic explanations for some of these effects. 
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Some of the concerns about the reliability and validity of subjective well-being measures can be 
addressed by choice of method of analysis. Measurement errors that may affect the reliability of 
SWB  measures  can  by  addressed  by  using  large  samples,  including  several  thousands  of 
respondents. Using large samples enhances the precision of statistical analyses. Psychologists often 
address  measurement  errors  in  smaller  samples  by  basing  the  item ’SWB’ on  several  survey 
questions  and  using  statistical  methods  to  construct/reveal  the  underlying  latent  variable  (e.g. 
principal component analysis) (Schimmack and Oishi, 2005). Some surveys randomize the ordering 
of the questions across interviewees in order to prevent the bias through order effects.
  
7.6. Fixed effects account for personality traits
Other  concerns  about  the  validity of  subjective well-being  measures  can  also be addressed by 
choice of method of analysis. Notably, each ‘cure’ comes along with other, new disadvantages that 
have to be taken into account. 
The  confounding influence  of  personality traits,  giving  rise  to  potentially spurious  correlations 
between two subjective measures, such as self-assessed health and SWB, can be addressed through 
the use of household panels (longitudinal studies) that observe the same person over some years. 
These panels allow to directly partial out the effects of personality traits so that partial correlations 
between  SWB  and  its  determinants  (correlations  conditional  on  these  unobserved  individual 
characteristics) can be obtained. Technically speaking, this can be achieved through calculating first 
differences  (relating  changes  in  SWB to  changes  in  its  determinants)  or  inclusion of  so-called 
individual fixed effects. Indeed, Ferrer–i-Carbonell and Frijters (2004) have shown that the bias by 
not taking into account unobserved personality traits is more severe by far compared to the bias that 
is generated through the violation of the cardinality assumption.33 However, these methodological 
approaches  have  the  disadvantage  that  they partial  out  the  effects  of  all time-invariant  factors 
likewise, not only those of personality traits in specific, so that their influence can rarely be tested. 
Typical  examples  are  gender,  religious  affiliation,  mother  tongue  and  childhood  experiences. 
Education at school is completed by most people before they enter the panel (not prior to the age of 
16). Thus, for most surveyed persons, education is part of their time-invariant characteristics. Other 
examples pertain to occupational and marital status – statistical identification of their impact on 
SWB rests on those individuals who change their status during the period of observation.        
33 In  principle,  estimation with OLS when the dependent  variable is  ordinal  (measured in  categories)  violates  the 
cardinality assumption of OLS.  
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Fixed effects account for culture bias
The inclusion of fixed effects may also partly resolve the issue of culture and language bias, which 
may affect responding behaviour. Language, ethnicity, and culture biases may occur at the macro-
level, namely as trait of the country one lives in, as well at the micro-level, as individual trait. Well-
known examples are the collective optimism bias in South-American countries and the national 
culture of misery and critical self-reflection in France (e.g. Duncan, 2005).34 In a household panel, 
individual fixed effects take account of both types of cultural biases (e.g. Ferrer-i-Carbonell, 2005, 
for an example), while excluding them calls for direct control for ethnicity (for the cultural divide 
in  Switzerland,  see Dorn et  al.,  2008).  However,  most  cross-national  comparisons still  rely on 
cross-sections of micro-data (or repeated cross-sections thereof (e.g.  Blanchflower and Oswald, 
2008a, b, for examples). In such setting, country fixed effects can de-bias the estimates for country-
specific culture effects, but not for those that may occur across individuals (of the same country). 
These must be resolved by inclusion of direct controls (if available) for personality traits, mother 
tongue or ethnicity, and religion.   
Validity of aggregate measures of happiness
Country rankings based on aggregate measures of subjective well-being appear more robust  to 
differences in national cultures. Particularly the validity tests by Blanchflower and Oswald (2008a, 
b) suggest that the happiness rankings can be fairly reproduced when measures of respondents’ 
health in place of SWB measures are employed. However, they cover only 16 European countries. 
Convergent  validity  is  also  considerably  stronger  for  aggregate  measures  of  the  cognitive 
component  of  SWB in  terms  of  the  correlation  between the  ‘happiness’ and  ‘life  satisfaction’ 
questions,  assuming that both intend to measure the same underlying construct.  At the country 
level, correlation is about 0.7 for more than 80 countries of the 3rd and 4th waves of the World 
Values Survey. In contrast, at the individual-level, correlation in the pooled sample amounts to only 
0.4, ranging between 0.0 and 0.8 in the country samples. 
However, even though the strong validity of aggregate measures may be appealing to researchers 
and policy-makers,  using them comes at  a cost.  For analysis,  having an aggregate  outcome as 
explanand requires aggregation of the explanatory variables.  However,  through the aggregation 
process important individual-specific information is lost, which affects the outcome of the analysis 
34 Similarly,  East-European  residents  report  systematically  lower  happiness,  which  is,  most  possibly,  an  effect  of 
institutional and economic transition and therefore not a time-invariant cultural trait.  
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that utilizes such measures. Not only does aggregation make it impossible to disentangle certain 
micro-level from macro-level effects, neglecting their  interactions (e.g.  for unemployment),  but 
even worse, the loss of information may bias the results at the aggregate level compared to the 
micro-level (Robinson, 1950). Fischer (2009a, b) discusses this issue in detail and gives specific 
examples for OECD countries. 
7.7.  Future development for cross-country comparability of  SWB measures
Recently, efforts have been undertaken to make individual responses to variants of the happiness 
question comparable across countries and cultures. There are two approaches: the first attempts to 
determine ‘conversion’ rates between two respondents with differing cultural  backgrounds.  The 
second attempts to equivalize the definitions and concepts of a ‘good life’ across persons that are 
implicitly assumed in the happiness question. 
Happiness Scale Interval Study
Using  concepts  from  sociology  and  psychology  to  measure  latent  constructs,  respondents  are 
surveyed in countries around the world. In the Happiness Scale Interval Study led by Prof. Ruut 
Veenhoven  (University  of  Rotterdam,  Veenhoven,  2009)  persons  from  different  cultures  and 
countries  assess  the  range  of  the  happiness  categories  on  the  (less-language-sensitive)  life 
satisfaction scale, so that the ,culture’ bias can be determined and a country-specific conversion rule 
can be calculated (personal communication with Ruut Veenhoven, January 2009).  
 
Vignettes/ factorial survey design 
The  cultural  bias  is  also  mitigated  by using  a  so-called  vignette  design.  Such  design  aims  at 
replacing abstract culture-specific values (e.g. ‘best life’) with a description of concrete events and 
situations, which are, supposedly, less susceptible to culture-specific perceptions (e.g. of what a 
good and desirable life constitutes). Because the respondent is put in a specific, but hypothetical 
situation, such question design is also referred to as ‘quasi-experimental’; it is also referred to as 
‘factorial survey design’ since abstract values are replaced by a factual situation. Given that the 
chosen vignettes are reasonably simple, translation incompatibilities should only play a minor role. 
Most  recent  cross-national  surveys  such  as  the  World  Values  Survey,  the  International  Social 
Survey Programme, the European Values Survey, or the European Barometer Survey do not employ 
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vignettes. The Gallup organisation plans to apply vignettes to the Cantril-ladder question of life 
satisfaction.   
8. Cardinal versus ordinal interpretation of SWB measures
8.1. Types of survey questions
Survey questions on SWB (e.g. happiness or life satisfaction question) measure the respondent’s 
answer on a scale of integers. The happiness question usually employs 3 to 5 categories, while life 
satisfaction is usually recorded on a 10- or 11-point scale. Both are, in principle, ordinal rankings of 
SWB (e.g. worst, less than worst, good, best), calling, in principle, for statistical methods that take 
the ordinality of the scale into account. Ordinal rankings imply that moves from one category to the 
next constitute only qualitative statements (improvement/worsening, respectively) and that changes 
by  one  category  are  not  quantitatively  comparable  across  their  starting  levels.  In  contrast, 
cardinality assumes that moving from e.g. 3 to 4 is an improvement as large as that when moving 
from 4 to 5, and that moving from  2 to 4 is an improvement as double as large compared to that 
when moving from 2 to 3, or from 7 to 8.  For calculating bivariate correlations (number of factors 
that  determine  happiness  =  1),  the  ordinality  of  SWB  measures  calls  for  application  of  the 
Spearman correlation measure, while for multivariate analyses (number of factors that determine 
happiness  > 1) an ordered probit or logit estimator should be employed.
8.2. Ordered probit versus OLS
However,  Ferrer-i-Carbonell  and  Frijters  (2004)  show  for  the  usual  10-point  life  satisfaction 
question that the assumption of cardinality or ordinality in the econometric model does not affect 1) 
direction and significance of influential explanatory variables and 2) the trade-offs between the 
decisive determinants.  In principle,  however,  the bias from assuming cardinality might become 
larger  as  the  number  of  categories  declines  (see  also  Spearman  correlation  coefficient  versus 
cardinality-assuming, normal correlation). Thus, while the bias for the associations with the life 
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satisfaction  question  may be  negligible,  it  may be  still  substantial  for  the  happiness  question, 
which, traditionally, employs fewer categories by far.35 
Neglecting the ordinal nature of the SWB measures also leads to differences in interpretation of 
regression coefficients, particularly when it comes to quantitative assessments. In ordered probit 
and  logit  models  marginal  effects  have  to  be  calculated  separately,  and  relate  to  changes  in 
probabilities of reporting a certain SWB category. The mathematical formula for such marginal 
effect reveals that its size is sensitive to what values the other variables in the model assume (which 
are held constant), e.g. whether the researcher considers a man or a woman. It is standard procedure 
to fix the remaining determinants at the sample mean, but any other value combination can equally 
be  chosen  (e.g.  a  representative  person).  In  contrast,  in  OLS  models  that  assume  cardinality 
estimated coefficients equal marginal effects, the sizes of which are independent of what values the 
remaining explanatory variables take on. Using OLS also eases the calculation and interpretation of 
the marginal effect  of two interacting variables which is important to identify heterogeneity of 
effects. The interpretation of these OLS marginal effects is in terms of quantitative increases in the 
dependent cardinal variable, the happiness measure. However,  in praxi, policy makers should be 
interested in direction of influences, relative sizes and (economic) trade-offs and rather than precise 
quantitative  assessments.  Fischer  (2009b)  discusses  the  influence  of  institutional  and  macro-
economic factors on subjective well-being in OECD countries, and provides examples for trade-off 
assessments based on relative sizes of OLS regression coefficients.36 
8.3. Aggregation as remedy?
The problems associated with assuming cardinality when ordinality is present could be mitigated 
by aggregating the individual information up to a higher level. One may view the calculation of 
national percentages or shares of those who report certain levels of SWB as a way to deal with 
ordinality,  as  national  means  clearly  are  based  on  the  assumption  of  cardinality.  The  resulting 
aggregate measures are, however, both cardinal, allowing to apply simple statistical methods of 
analysis.
35 Notably,  as  discussed  before,  the  same  study  shows  that  neglecting  unobserved  individual  heterogeneity  (e.g. 
personality traits) biases results stronger by far compared to applying OLS to an ordinal 10-scale measure.
36 It is recommended to base relative size comparisons on standardized coefficients. 
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Table 5 shows for the World Values Survey 1997-2001 world sample that the cognitive component 
of  SWB  measured  either  as  means  of  life  satisfaction  and  as  population  shares  are  strongly 
correlated up to a level that  would be termed quasi-multicollinear in a regression context.  The 
correlation coefficients are all well above 0.9 (in absolute terms). Table 6 repeats the same exercise 
for 30 OECD countries, coming to qualitatively identical conclusions. 
Table  5:  Simple  correlations  between  several  aggregate  measures  of  life  satisfaction  for  81 
countries in the World Values Survey, 1997-2001
Mean LSF Min LSF Max 3 LSF Max 4 LSF
Mean LSF 1.0000
Min LSF -0.9170 1.0000
Max 3 LSF 0.9591 -0.7787 1.0000
Max 4 LSF 0.9788 -0.8475 0.9801 1.0000
Source: World Values Survey, combined 3rd and 4th waves, 1997-2001, 81 countries, 117’264 persons.
Notes: The original life satisfaction (LSF) variable ranges from 1 to 10. ‘Min LSF’ denotes the share of people who 
report any of the three lowest categories of LSF (1, 2, or 3).  Max 3 (4) LSF denotes the share of people reporting any 
of the three (four) highest categories of life satisfaction (1, 2, or 3 (or 4)).  Observations with missing life satisfaction 
information have been excluded. 
Table 6: Simple correlations between several aggregate measures of life satisfaction for 30 OECD 
countries
Mean LSF Min LSF Max 3 LSF Max 4 LSF
Mean LSF 1.0000
Min LSF -0.9102 1.0000
Max 3 LSF 0.9798 -0.8399 1.0000
Max 4 LSF 0.9840 -0.9292 0.9695 1.0000
Notes: See Table 5.
9. Conclusion: What measure of subjective well-being to use ? 
To  wrap  up,  it  appears  that  the  cognitive  component  (decision  utility)  is  (still)  deemed  more 
relevant to social policy decision-making compared to the affective component of subjective well-
being (experienced utility) - possibly, due to path dependency, but also because of the still high 
costs of generating sufficient frequency in collecting affect data - despite of their advantage of a 
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more accurate reflection of present-time utility (losses). These high costs of collection, by the way, 
do not allow developing countries to participate. 
In addition, optimal human behaviour in the long-run appears to relate to decisions based on the 
cognitive  component  of  SWB,  not  the  affective  one  -  focusing  on  the  latter  causes  various 
prediction biases. In contrast, information on decision utility may be easily obtained by exploiting 
already quite common household panel surveys or population census, which are repeated at least on 
an annual basis.  A simple way to achieve fast  cross-country coverage would be to incorporate 
questions measuring SWB in EU-SILC (European Union Statistics on Income and Living Conditions), 
as soon as possible.
When it comes to measuring the cognitive component of SWB (decision utility), we have also seen 
that the life satisfaction question-variant is to be preferred over the happiness-variant as the first is 
less likely to be affected by mood swings that are a source of measurement error. It also seems 
recommendable to apply a 10- to 11-point scale in place of a 4- to 5-point scale, because of reasons 
of  validity,  the  simplicity  of  statistical  analysis  (OLS),  and  interpretation  of  results  (marginal 
effects). 
In order to allow for comparisons of national well-being over longer time spans, however, previous 
(national) versions of SWB questions should be continued, at least for another 30 years (one year  = 
one data point). Instead, for analyzing variation in SWB across individuals, panels are preferred 
over  cross-sections,  and  a  minimum of  three  consecutive  years  is  necessary  for  a  reasonable 
statistical  method  (individual  fixed  effects),  and  7  consecutive  years  for  analyzing  adaptation 
effects.     
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